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APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES  
IN COLOMBIA 
 





  Colombia's experience in the use of safeguards and anti-dumping duties differs 
from international trends. On the one hand, the number of investigations conducted is substantially 
lower than that recorded in most of the hemisphere's large and medium-size countries. On the 
other, while there is a growing international trend  of more frequent use of anti-dumping as 
opposed to safeguards, in Colombia the safeguard process has been the more used policy 
instrument. Although several large and medium-size firms are familiar with the application of 
safeguards and anti-dumping duties, there is still a relative unfamiliarity regarding the instruments  in 
most of the private sector. The institutional arrangements related to the investigations and the 
decision-making processes have proven to be stable and sound. The trade liberalization process in 
the country has created awareness of the importance of preserving the competitiveness of 
production chains to strengthen their insertion in international markets, which has restrained the 
authorities from restricting access to intermediate goods and raw materials. The evaluation of the 
Colombian experience also raises concerns about the potential discretional use of these 
instruments. The relatively intense use of safeguards and anti-dumping measures in some specific 
periods and sectors, especially in the agricultural sector, shows that the institutional framework 
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1 This document has taken into account some points of view of a number of Colombian Government Officials 
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countries they represent.  Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org.   3 
Introduction 
 
In some major respects, Colombia's recent experience in applying safeguards and anti-dumping 
duties differs from international trends. On the one hand, the number of investigations conducted is 
substantially lower than that recorded in most of the hemisphere's large and medium-size 
countries.
2 On the other, while there is a growing trend of  more frequent use of anti-dumping as 
opposed to safeguards around the world, no such trend is observed in Colombia. 
 
Several factors could explain the distinctive features of Colombia's experience, among them the 
relative ignorance of the private sector regarding the meaning and scope of the instruments, the 
little discretionality the government has shown in their use, and the stability and robustness of the 
institutions linked to the investigations and the decision-making process. Additionally, the 
interviews conducted in preparation of this paper indicate that there is an official awareness of the 
importance of preserving the competitiveness of production chains to improve the country's 
performance in international markets. 
 
This document seeks to analyze the evolution in the application of safeguards and anti-dumping 
duties in Colombia since the beginning of the 1990's, as well as to explain its determining factors 
and the role these instruments have played in the country's trade policy. Section I summarizes the 
recent evolution of Colombia's trade policy, the framework within which the above-mentioned 
instruments were developed. Section II describes the evolution of the background and the current 
situation of legislation related to safeguards and anti-dumping duties. Section III characterizes and 
analyzes the various safeguards and anti-dumping investigations carried out since 1990, and 
discusses some case studies. Section IV  deals in detail with aspects related to the political 
economy of the application of such instruments. Finally, Section V presents some conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 For example, Tavares et al (2001) compares Colombia’s 35 anti-dumping investigations against countries in 
the FTAA zone between 1987 and 2000, with 782 in the United States, 302 in Canada and 233 in Mexico.   4 
1. THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF TRADE POLICY 
 
As most Latin American countries, during the second half of the last century, Colombia applied an 
industrialization strategy based on import substitution. While this policy promoted the 
diversification of the productive structure, by the end of the 1980's the protectionist strategy had 
become exhausted. The closed economy had fostered concentrated property structures, high 
prices, low product quality and few incentives for innovation. At the same time, the high cost of 
imports made production based on foreign raw materials more expensive, thus generating an anti-
export bias in the economy. 
 
Faced with this situation, the government implemented a trade liberalization policy that began at 
the end of the 1980's and was consolidated at the beginning of the 1990's, and also extended the 
regional integration processes. Such initiatives not only led to a reduction in the level of protection 
of the economy, but also created a new role for private agents in the formulation of trade policy. 
While protectionism had favored the development of a lobbying culture among business people to 
adjust policy-decisions to their interests, liberalization significantly reduced the space for that sort 
of lobbying. 
 
A.   The Opening of Trade 
 
The liberalization policy comprised the elimination of quantitative restrictions to imports, the 
reduction of tariffs and number of tariff levels, the reduction of the number of procedures required 
for foreign trade, and a series of institutional reforms.
3 (Hommes et al, 1994) The measures taken 
at the beginning of the 1990's reduced the percentage of tariff positions subject to quantitative 
restrictions from 73% to 1%, while the economy's nominal average tariff fell from levels close to 
100%, to 11.1% and the effective protection was set at 26.2% (Graph I-1.) 
                                                 
3 Before the liberalization, imports were controlled through a prior licensing arrangement and import quotas 





In the context of the new trade policy, a special treatment was afforded to the agricultural sector. 
The distortions of the international markets led to the design of a variable tariff arrangement for a 
sizeable number of products, i.e. price bands. With this mechanism, when international prices fall 
below a certain level, tariffs are automatically increased. By the same token, when international 
prices increase above a given level, tariffs are reduced. The price band mechanism was 
harmonized at the Andean level and it currently covers 13 main products and close to 150 tariff 
positions of derivative or substitute products.
4 
 
Although the original objective of the Andean System of Bands was to insulate regional economies 
from the fluctuations of international agricultural prices, the design of the instrument had a 
protectionist bias that soon became apparent. In fact, the average tariff applied to the products 
                                                 
 4 The main products covered by the Andean system of price bands are meats, vegetable oils, wheat, dairy 
products, corn, rice, soja and sugar, as well as their derivatives and substitutes. 
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Source: Echavarría and Gamboa (2001)   6 
that are part of the System reached levels close to 60% in the last few years. Although Colombian 
authorities have justified this situation based on the argument that this protection is a way to deal 
with the subsidies of developed countries, several papers have shown that the protection 
generated by price bands has exceeded the level of distortion generated by said subsidies.
5 Thus, 
a good share of Colombia's agricultural sector has managed to remain outside the liberalization 
trends that began in 1990. 
 
 
II.  Graph I-2 
 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that these trade reforms took place in a context of strong currency 
devaluations, which persisted almost uninterrupted until the end of 1997 (Graph I-2). Since the 
beginning of 1999, there have been corrections to this trend and it is currently deemed that the real 
rate of exchange is close to its equilibrium level. However, as it will be seen later, in certain 
                                                 
5 See Bálcazar (2003.) 
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   7 
periods, the drop in the real exchange rate did not result in increased applications for anti-dumping 
duties and safeguards. 
  
A.  Regional Negotiations 
 
In addition to the tariff reduction adopted between 1990 and 1991, the main factor that 
transformed Colombia's tariff structure was the negotiations leading to greater regional integration. 
In that area, the most significant processes were the strengthening of the Andean integration, the 
negotiation with Mexico in the framework of the Group of Three, and the signing of an agreement 
with Chile. Of these, the one with the greatest effective impact on Colombia's tariff structure was 
the strengthening of Andean integration (Reina et al. 1996). 
 
In December 1991, the heads of the Andean countries signed the Barahona Act, which reiterated 
the purpose of establishing a regional free trade area and a common external tariff. These 
objectives were almost totally met. At the beginning of 1992, the Andean free trade zone became 
effective and Venezuela and Colombia established a common external tariff for most of the tariff 
universe. At the end of the same year, Peru suspended the liberalization program and decided to 
maintain significant exceptions to regional free trade. On their part, Venezuela, Colombia and 
Ecuador moved forward in harmonizing their tariffs in an imperfect manner, since the latter 
invoked its condition as a  country with a lower level of relative development to maintain a tariff 
below that of its partners for several products. 
 
During the mid 1990s, Colombia negotiated agreements with Chile and Mexico, with a lesser 
scope than the Andean integration. The agreement with Chile became effective in January 1994 
and it is restricted to liberalizing trade in goods. The agreement with Mexico was negotiated in the 
framework of the Treaty of the Group of Three (G-3) and comprises, besides the liberalization of 
goods,  agreements on the so-called new generation issues: services, intellectual property, 
government procurement, investment and dispute resolution, among others. Chart I-1 shows the   8 







  Preferential Tariffs granted by Colombia 
  Liberalization Levels 
 
COUNTRIES    COLOMBIA 
ARGENTINA  Average tariff: 10.7% 
BOLIVIA  Free trade 
BRASIL  Average tariff: 10.6% 
CANADA  11.7% 
CHILE  91% of tariff items excepted from duties in 1999 
COSTA RICA  11.7% 
ECUADOR  Free trade 
EL SALVADOR  11.7% 
GUATEMALA  11.7% 
HONDURAS  11.7% 
MEXICO  Average tariff: 4.9% 
NICARAGUA  11.7% 
PERU  List of preferences 
UNITED STATES  11.7% 
VENEZUELA  Free trade 
Average MFN tariff level  11.7% 
Source: Reina and Zuluaga (2001)   9 
 
As a result of the regional integration process, the geographical distribution of Colombia's trade 
flows was partially modified (Annexes 1 and 2). Between 1989 and 2003, the share of the 
Andean Community countries increased significantly as a destination for Colombian exports. The 
share of other countries in the hemisphere also increased, such as those of Central America and 
Mexico. During the same period, imports from Andean countries and Mexico also increased their 
share, at the expense of those from the United States, the European Union and Japan. 
 
B.  Main Institutional Reforms 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, currently Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, was created in 
1991, taking over the policies  that had previously been the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Economic Development. Its major functions include controlling the enforcement of foreign trade 
policies and procedures, as well as formulating and executing regional negotiation strategies. 
 
As a result of the reforms introduced in 1991, the Colombian Institute of Foreign Trade 
(INCOMEX) became responsible for the prevention and investigation of unfair trade practices. 
The Institute's Unfair Practices Deputy Direction filled the void that existed prior to the 
liberalization, when there was no specific agency in charge of issues such as dumping and 
underinvoicing of imports. Then, in 2003 the Deputy Direction of Trade Practices of the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Tourism took on the responsibility for investigating unfair trade practices. 
The Deputy Direction is currently the investigating authority in cases of dumping, subsidies and 
safeguards, and it is charged with investigating the merits of applications, carrying out 
investigations and making the pertinent recommendations to decision-makers. 
 
III.  EVOLUTION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND SAFEGUARD RULES  
   10 
The commercial opening that took place in Colombia at the beginning of the 1990s required the 
development of legal instruments to deal with the foreign competition that had been previously 
neutralized through protectionist policies. 
 
Although Colombia had joined the GATT in 1981, the development of general safeguard rules 
was very limited. As opposed to this, within the framework of the Andean Group, the application 
of trade preferences of greater magnitude caused Andean safeguards to be used.
6 
 
The design of anti-dumping mechanisms in Colombia dates to the beginning of the trade 
liberalization, while the rules on safeguards were implemented in 1994. Thus, the first two anti-
dumping rules (Decrees 1500 and 2444 of 1990) evidence the traces of a protectionist approach. 
Law 7 of 1991 was the basis to modify anti-dumping rules in 1993, with Decree 150 of that year, 
and to pass Decree 809 of 1994, which regulated safeguards for the first time in Colombia. 
 
A.  Background of Anti-dumping Legislation   
 
Anti-dumping legislation was devised as a complement of the trade liberalization process and was 
regulated by Decree 1500 of 1990. The instrument was presented to the productive sector as an 
option to confront unfair trade practices, with the intent of reducing the entrepreneurs’ concerns 
regarding imports. This first norm established that imposing anti-dumping duties would respond to 
the public interest, with preventive or corrective purposes.
7 The causes were limited to serious 
injury or threat of serious injury  to a production existing in Colombia. Decree 1500 was 
rapidly replaced by Decree 2440 of 1990, which made some adjustments in the deadlines for 
                                                 
 6 The Cartagena Agreement, that gave rise to the creation of the Andean Group, contemplates four types of 
safeguards: sector-wide, per product, by reason of exchange rate, and another related to balance of payment 
crises. Between 1980 and 1990 the Andean countries invoked safeguard clauses over thirty times. Approval for 
the measure was granted in a little over twenty occasions, in most of which the safeguard invoked was 
exchange rate related. 
 7 The concept of public interest makes reference to the obligation of taking into account, in the decision 
making process, all parties that may be potentially affected by the enforcement of a measure. This gives the 
decision maker a margin to deviate from eminently technical criteria.   11 
different stages of investigations and introduced the concept of injury by reason of massive 
imports. 
 
As a result of the anti-dumping discussion in the GATT context, in 1993 a new decree was 
passed incorporating the refinements that had become consolidated in the multilateral scenario in 
terms of evidence of injury and threat of injury, as well as in the investigation procedures. This 
decree changed once again the setup of the Trade Practices Committee in order to adjust the new 
institutional arrangements for foreign trade expressed in Law 7 of 1991. In addition to the Director 
of the Foreign Trade Institute (Incomex), the agency responsible for the investigations, the 
members of the Committee included a delegate of the Senior Foreign Trade Council (Consejo 
Superior de Comercio Exterior), an advisor to the same council, the Vice Minister of Trade and 
the vice ministers of the sectors related with the investigation.
8 This rule established that, before 
making its recommendation to the Foreign Trade Ministry, the Committee must take into advise 
the opinion of the Superintendent of Trade and Industry, who is responsible, among other things, 
for safeguarding the rights of consumers. 
 
Decree 150 of 1993 was repealed by Decree 299 of 1995 that incorporates the progress of the 
Uruguay Round into Colombia's legislation. The most important changes include limiting the 
duration of duties to a maximum of five years, with the possibility of reviewing the duties one year 
after their effectiveness. The process of adjustment to the multilateral arrangements was completed 
with Decree 991 of 1998, the rule currently in force.  For the first time in Colombia this measure 
introduced specific anti-dumping legislation, since the previous decrees regulated dumping and 
subsidies jointly. 
 
                                                 
8 The Senior Foreign Trade Council is a National Government advisory organization on all aspects related to 
the country's foreign trade and its members are the President of the Republic, who chairs it, the ministers of the 
economic area, the head of the National Planning Department, the manager of the Central Bank, the Director of 
Customs, the advisors to the Senior Council and the President of the Foreign Trade Bank (Banco de Comercio 
Exterior). The last three have no voting rights.   12 
B.  Current Anti-dumping Regulations   
 
Decree 991 of 1998 regulates the application of anti-dumping duties, both for WTO member 
countries and  non members. In the case of investigations of non-WTO members, the sectoral 
representation of domestic production to request an investigation requires a lower percentage. 
Additionally to these countries, it is possible to apply provisional duties to from the beginning of 
the investigation. 
 
1.  Causes for the application of duties  
 
Colombia's anti-dumping legislation contemplates the three elements required by the Multilateral 
Trade System for the application of anti-dumping measures: (i) the existence of dumping or price 
differentials between the exporter's domestic market and the destination market; (ii) the threat of 
injury or significantly retarding the establishment of a branch of domestic production; and (iii) a 
causal relationship between the dumping and the above situations that may be faced by domestic 
production. 
 
An analysis of the legislation in force, which is almost a copy of the multilateral disciplines, makes 
it possible to conclude that it preserves the margin of maneuvre that the Anti-dumping Agreement 
affords to investigating authorities. The Colombian Authority may select the methodology to 
calculate the normal value, i.e. the price that is used as a benchmark to compare with the price of 
exports. Similarly, the Authority may suggest the level of anti-dumping duty without any rule 
limiting it to the injury caused to domestic production. However, it should be noted that the 
regulations for the calculation of the duties do contemplate the need to consider the effect of the 
measures on the domestic market and on the domestic prices of the product. 
 
Regarding the rules to determine whether there is evidence of threat of injury, injury or important 
retardation in a production industry, the flexibility granted by the multilateral agreements is 
maintained. As for the material retard in a branch of domestic production, the legislation provides   13 
that the factors to be reviewed include feasibility studies, loans negotiated and/or machinery 
purchase agreements leading to new projects or the expansion of existing plants, as well as 
whether the domestic market is being adequately and sufficiently supplied. 
 
2.  Evidence to be submitted  
 
Colombia's legislation replicates the multilateral requirements in terms of information to initiate an 
investigation for dumping practices. It not only requires that the product must be identified and 
evidence included on the price differential must be provided, but also that information on the 
dumping and its effects on the Colombian market be submitted, especially with regard to price 
behavior. As for the requirements to open an investigation, it may be noted that besides the need 
to submit the respective evidence of all the required information
9, it also contemplates the 
possibility of conducting verification visits to the applicants, a practice that is not widespread and 
that in some countries is limited to exporters. 
 
3.  Procedures, instances and timeframes  
 
The anti-dumping process has a technical instance that takes place with the Deputy Direction of 
Trade Practices of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, and an instance of a technical and 
political nature, which is the Committee of Trade Practices  (Comité de Prácticas 
Comerciales).
10 The Superintendent of Trade and Industry is involved in the decision on a 
possible price agreement, the final outcome of the investigation and the review of the anti-dumping 
measures established. 
 
                                                 
9 Including indicators such as the actual and potential drop in sales, profits, production volume, market share 
and volume of imports at dumped prices. 
10  The members of this Committee are the Deputy Director of Trade Practices of the Ministry of Trade, a 
delegate of the Senior Foreign Trade Council, an advisor to said council, the Vice Minister of Trade, who 
chairs the Committee, and the vice ministers of the sectors connected with the investigation.   14 
The maximum time to carry out and conclude an investigation is eight months, counted from its 
initiation. The Deputy Direction of Trade Practices has 20 business days to evaluate the 
investigation application. Once the investigation has been opened, questionnaires have to be 
remitted to the interested parties, who have forty calendar days to answer them. The Deputy 
Direction of Trade Practices has 65 calendar days since the beginning of the investigation to make 
a preliminary decision and establish provisional duties, as may be the case. Once a preliminary 
determination has been adopted, the Deputy Direction of Trade Practices may obtain evidence, 
make verification visits and conduct hearings with the parties. In total, the Deputy Direction has 
three months to submit a final report to the Trade Practices Committee, as from the preliminary 
determination. The Committee issues an opinion that has to be circulated to the interested parties, 
who have 10 calendar days to make their comments. Subsequently, the Committee has 10 
calendar days to review comments and produce an opinion for the Minister who, in turn, has 7 
calendar days to adopt a decision. 
 
4.  Duration of the measures   
 
Anti-dumping duties can be maintained for 5 years, extendable for equal successive periods, 
unless the exporters, foreign producers or importers of the product demonstrate there is no reason 
to maintain them. 
 
C.  Background of the legislation on safeguards  
 
Colombia's safeguard legislation dates back to 1994, when the process of economic liberalization 
had already been consolidated. Said rules stemmed, on the one hand, from the need to respond to 
the demands of the private sector for instruments to exercise an industrial policy and on the other, 
to comply with the requirements derived from Colombia's membership in the World Trade 
Organization. The legislation, enacted by Decree 809 of 1994, applied both to tariff changes not 
in violation of multilateral commitments and to tariffs that exceeded the tariff levels consolidated 
before the WTO.   15 
 
The regulations established serious injury  as a cause, defined as an important and significant 
deterioration in the situation of one branch of national production, and required a causal 
relationship between the increased imports and the injury. The application was to be filed with 
INCOMEX, as investigating authority, which reported to the Customs and Tariff Affairs 
Committee  (Comité de Asuntos Aduaneros y Arancelarios) which, in turn, had to make a 
recommendation to the Senior Foreign Trade Council. This last instance is responsible for 
assessing the measure and providing an opinion to the government on its application.
11 
 
In addition to this regulation, Decree 2657 of 1994 was passed applying specifically to countries 
with which no trade agreements have been signed and which therefore, deviates from multilateral 
arrangements. It provides for the application of the measure without proof of injury or threat of 
injury. Subsequently, certain limits were set to the application of provisional measures and a 




Decree 809 of 1994 was repealed in 1998 by Decree 152, which enacted legislation for WTO 
member countries in accordance with multilateral arrangements, where the causes are serious 
injury or threat of serious injury. This is the legislation currently in force for that group of countries. 
 
Additionally, in 1999 Decree 1407 regulated the so-called special safeguard or safeguard by 
reason of disruption, which applies to imports of any origin, provided that the requested tariff 
increase does not exceed the level consolidated by Colombia in its list of multilateral commitments 
                                                 
11 The members of the Customs and Tariff Affairs Committee are the Vice Minister of Trade, who chairs it, the 
Vice Ministers of the economic area, the Deputy Chief of the National Planning Department, the Director of 
Customs, and the advisors to the Senior Foreign Trade Council. In 1998 it was established that to assess 
safeguards, the Superintendent of Trade and Industry would be invited to provide an opinion on the measure. 
12 Decrees 2038 and 2259 of 1996.   16 
when the investigation involves WTO member countries. This rule is less strict in terms of causes 
for application and is currently in force with an indefinite extension.
13 
 
D.  Current Regulations on Safeguards  
 
The above overview underlines the existence of several types of safeguard measures in Colombian 
legislation. On the one hand, there are those applicable to imports from WTO member countries, 
among which there are three categories: those applicable to agricultural and farm products, 
transition ones applicable to textiles and apparel in light of the WTO's agreement for that sector, 
and those applicable to the remaining products. 
 
On the other hand, there are measures applicable to non-WTO member countries and the so-
called special safeguard or safeguard by reason of disruption allowing for the increase of 
import duties above the Common External Tariff of the Andean Community, which applies to any 
country as long as the measures do not exceed the WTO consolidated tariff levels. Additionally, 
there are safeguards applicable to products which have been the object of tariff liberalization in the 
framework of Regional Integration Agreements, such as the Andean safeguards, the safeguard in 
the Agreement of the Group of Three,  and the safeguard of the Agreement between Colombia 
and Chile. 
 
This paper will focus on the analysis of the safeguard for WTO member countries (Decree 152 of 
1998) and the special safeguard (Decree 1407 of 1999). The former may be characterized as a 
safeguard by reason of injury, and the latter as a safeguard by reason of disruption. 
 
1.  WTO Safeguard  
a)  Causes for measures  
 
                                                 
13 Decree 2681 of 2001.   17 
The WTO safeguard (Decree 152 of 1998) requires imports of the affected product to have 
increased, whether in absolute terms or in comparison with the domestic production of the good, 
and in conditions that cause or threaten to cause a serious injury to a branch of domestic 
production. Additionally, it also established that the investigation should prove causal relationship 
between the injury or the threat of injury and the increase in imports. 
  
b)  Evidence to be submitted  
 
The regulations require submitting financial and accounting information, signed by a public 
accountant, on the industry corresponding to the product to be investigated. It also requires 
submitting information on the objectives that the applicant firm will attain within the so-called 
adjustment program, which refers t o the adoption of modernization programs to increase 
competitiveness and adapt to the new competitive conditions. 
 
c)  Procedures, instances and terms  
 
An investigation related to a safeguard by reason of injury lasts approximately 127 days in the 
technical instance, during which the Custom and Tariff Affairs Committee and the Senior Foreign 
Trade Council make their decisions. The former has 15 business days to review the technical 
report and make a recommendation to the latter. If the recommendation is positive, the Ministry of 
Trade is asked to conduct consultations. Finally, the Senior Foreign Trade Council adopts the 
measure. According to the regulations, if the recommendation from the Customs and Tariff Affairs 
Committee is negative, the Senior Foreign Trade Council may deviate from it and request that 
consultations be held. 
 
d)  Term of the Measures  
 
Safeguard measures have a maximum term of four years, extendable for another four. 
   18 
2.  Special Safeguard  
 
The decree regulating the so-called  special safeguard defines it as a "special procedure to 
impose safeguard measures." This mechanism is not strictly a safeguard according to WTO 
parameters. The measure that is applied is a tariff increase above the common external tariff 
agreed with the Andean countries, but for WTO member countries it may not exceed the  tariff 
level consolidated before this Organization. Based on that characteristic, this instrument has not 
been notified to the WTO as a safeguard. 
 
The special safeguard has several differences with the general legislation established in 1998. 
Firstly, the cause to invoke this rule is that an important proportion of a domestic production 
branch has suffered or could suffer a disruption by reason of an increase in imports or imports 
occurring in unfair conditions, such as low prices or large quantities.
14 Secondly, the rule does not 
require an adjustment program to be submitted by the applicant firm. 
 
Thirdly, the rule shortens the period of investigation, since it establishes that the Deputy Direction 
of Trade Practices will have 20 business days to produce recommendations to the Custom and 
Tariff Affairs Committee, as opposed to 25 days pursuant to Decree 152 of 1998. Besides, all 
necessary visits and evidence must be completed within this 20 day term. The Customs and Tariff 
Affairs Committee has 5 business days to make its technical report and submit it to the Senior 
Foreign Trade Council, as compared to 15 days under Decree 152 of 1998. Finally, the 
safeguard measures by reason of disruption are limited to the imposition of a duty and can only 
remain in force for two years, non-extendable. 
 
In summary, Colombia's legislation on dumping and safeguards follows the guidelines developed 
by the WTO at the multilateral level. However, there are two aspects in these regulations that 
stand out because of their analytical interest. The first relates to the fact that there are two different 
                                                 
 14 Decree 1407 of  1999.   19 
decision-making instances for the application of duties and for the adoption of safeguard 
measures. The general modification of the tariff that a safeguard implies must have the approval of 
the instance studying tariff policy (Customs and Tariff Affairs Committee) and the President of the 
Republic. In contrast, a tariff modification resulting from a process of defense against unfair 
competition is the responsibility of the Minister of Trade. 
 
The second factor relates to the so-called "special safeguard", which isn’t strictly a safeguard but a 
mechanism that makes it possible to increase tariffs above the Andean commitments, without 








The first dumping and safeguards investigations in Colombia date back to the end of the 1990’s 
and mid 1994, in coincidence with the implementation of each of the laws on these matters. 
 
Between 1990 and 2004, 37 dumping investigations have taken place in Colombia (an average of 
2.6 cases per year), while there were 34 safeguards-related investigations between 1994 and 
2004 (3.4 cases per year). The greater dynamism of safeguard investigations is due to the number 
of cases in the Andean Community. During this period, 12 investigations were conducted in the 
Andean zone, while the investigations carried out within the framework of the WTO and for the 
so-called special safeguard amount to 11 and 10 cases, respectively (Chart III.1.) If the Andean 
safeguards are excluded, the yearly average would drop to 2.1 investigations per year.
16 
                                                 
15 This section draws on the information included in Annexes 3 and 4. 
16 As seen in the second section of this paper, the special safeguard is not strictly a safeguard but rather an 
arrangement that allows for tariff measures to be levied up to the level consolidated in the WTO, and is higher 
than the tariffs applied pursuant to the Andean Common External Tariff (AEC.)   20 
 
Independently from whether the Andean safeguards are included in the calculation or not, 
Colombia’s experience differs from the international trend regarding the adoption of this type of 
measures vis-a-vis anti-dumping duties. According to Finger (2002), between 1983 and 1993, an 
annual average of 3 safeguard measures was reported to the GATT, in accordance with Article 
XIX of the Agreement, while the yearly average of dumping cases was 164. While the worldwide 
statistic is one safeguard case for every 55 cases of dumping per year, for Colombia the figure is 
almost 1 to 1.
17 
 
Chart III.1               
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED             
1990-2004               





  Conducted 
In 
process  Conducted 
In 




     
No duties or 
measures 
imposed       
No  
imposition          
Dumping  37  14  4  52.1  60.9  44.4  37.8  10.8 
Safeguard  
1/  34  9  5  47.9  39.1  55.6  26.5  14.7 
   WTO  11  1  2  15.5  4.3  22.2  9.1  18.2 
   Special safeguard  10  5  2  14.1  21.7  22.2  50.0  20.0 
   Andean  12  3  0  16.9  13.0  0.0  25.0  0.0 
   AEC 24  1  0  1  1.4  0.0  11.1  0.0  100.0 
                 
TOTAL  71  23  9  100.0  100.0  100.0  32.4  12.7 
1/ The information on safeguards is broken down in accordance with the existing legislation, Decree 152/98 for WTO member countries; Decree 
1407/99 for all the so-called special safeguard countries;  Andean rules; ACE 24, which is the Agreement between Colombia and Chile within 
the framework of ALADI, using ALADI´s Resolution No. 70.  
Source: Calculated by the authors based on Ministry of Trade data. 
 
A. Evolution of investigations 1990-2004 
 
Between 1990 and 2004 there have been a total of 71 dumping and safeguard related 
investigations in Colombia. Of these, 37 are dumping investigations and 34 are safeguard 
                                                 
17 Finger, J.M. (2002), “Safeguards: Making sense of GATT/WTO provisions allowing for import restrictions” 
in Development, Trade and the WTO: a Handbook, Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English eds., 
World Bank.   21 
investigations. Of the latter, 17% have been Andean safeguards, 14% special safeguards and 
15% WTO safeguards (Chart III.1.) 
 
In 23 cases out of the total investigations conducted in the above period, no duties or measures 
were levied. Breaking down the figures, it is found that 61% of the investigations where no duties 
were imposed correspond to dumping cases, as compared to 39% for safeguard cases. Among 
the various classes of safeguards, the special safeguard accounts for the highest number of cases 
where no measures were applied, followed by the Andean safeguard. As of the first semester of 
2004, 9 of the 71 investigations conducted were in process (4 cases of dumping and 5 of 
safeguards), of which 2 were submitted under the WTO rules and 2 under the so-called special 
safeguard.  
 
The highest number of anti-dumping applications was submitted in 1998, while 2001 stands out as 
the year when more safeguard applications were filed. It may be noted that there does not seem to 
exist a relationship between the use of the instruments and the evolution of the exchange rate, since 
the highest number of applications was submitted during the period of greatest devaluation. What 
does seem evident is that the introduction of a more flexible instrument such as the special 
safeguard, generated a demand for this type of commercial defenses (Graph III.1.) 
 
Graph III.1   22 
 
Finally, two aspects related to safeguard investigations may be highlighted. On the one hand, the 
figures evidence a greater relative use of the so-called special safeguard as compared to the 
WTO safeguard. Although the number of WTO safeguard investigations is almost equal to those 
of the special safeguard, the period during which the two instruments have been in force indicates 
a greater dynamism in the application of the latter. In the ten years of existence of the WTO 
safeguard, there has been, on average, one investigation per year, while the average number of 
investigations under the special safeguard has been 2 per year between 1999 and 2004. The 
preference for this last type of instrument could be the result of less stringent requirements to 
prove the disruption and of shorter periods of investigation and decision-making than those 
contemplated in the WTO safeguard. 
 
Summarizing, between 1990 and 2004 Colombia has made a relatively equal use of the anti-
dumping and safeguard arrangements. To a great extent this trend is the result of the recurrent use 
of the Andean safeguard, although if it is excluded from the statistics, an important number of 

























Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism and Banco de la República   23 
safeguard investigations still remain.
18 It may be noted that the proportion of investigations not 
resulting in the levying of duties or measures has been higher in the case of dumping investigations. 
Additionally, with the adoption of the special safeguard in 1999, the conditions were created for 
an increase in the number of applications linked to this type of measures. 
 
E.  Sectors applying for investigation 
 
Out of the total investigations conducted between 1990 and 2004, 17% corresponded to 
agricultural products, understood as the summation of agriculture and agricultural industry 
products, and 83% to industrial products (Chart III.2). The agricultural sector has made greater 
use of the safeguard mechanism as compared to anti-dumping measures. Of the total investigations 
conducted for agricultural products, 25% were for dumping and 75% for safeguards, and of the 
later percentage, three fifths corresponded to Andean measures. 
 
Of the dumping investigations, 92% focused on industrial products and only 8% corresponded to 
agricultural ones. In the case of safeguards, 26.5% corresponded to agricultural products and the 
remaining 73.5% to industrial goods. The case of the Andean safeguard stands out, to the extent 
that 58% of the investigations conducted refer to agricultural products. The investigations under 
the special safeguard only relate to industrial products. 
 
Chart III.2  
 
INVESTIGATIONS BY SECTORS (1990-2004) 
 
Number of Investigations 
Conducted  No duty or measures imposed 
  
 No imposition/ Conducted 
Mechanism 
  
   Agricultural  Industrial  Agricultural  Industrial  Agricultural  Industrial 
Dumping  3  34  3  11  100.0  32.4 
Safeguard  9  25  0  9  0.0  36.0 
   WTO  1  10  0  1  0.0  10.0 
   Special  0  10  0  5    50.0 
                                                 
18 The application of the Andean safeguard contributes to making the number of safeguard cases not much 
lower than those of dumping. H owever, if the Andean investigations are substracted, the percentage of 
safeguard cases is still 37% of the total, as compared to 63% linked to dumping.   24 
   Andean  7  5  0  3    60.0 
   AEC 24  1  0  0  0     
TOTAL  12  59  3  20  25.0  33.9 
             
Percentage breakdown of total investigations 
Conducted  No duty or measures imposed 
Mechanism 
  
   Agricultural  Industrial  Agricultural  Industrial 
Dumping  25.0  57.6  100.0  55.0 
Safeguard  75.0  42.4  0.0  45.0 
   WTO  8.3  16.9  0.0  5.0 
   Special  0.0  16.9  0.0  25.0 
   Andean  58.3  8.5  0.0  15.0 
   AEC 24  8.3  0.0  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
         
Percentage breakdown per mechanism 
Conducted  No duty or measures imposed 
Mechanism 
  
   Agricultural  Industrial  Agricultural  Industrial 
Dumping  8.1  91.9  21.4  78.6 
Safeguard  26.5  73.5  0.0  100.0 
   WTO  9.1  90.9  0.0  100.0 
   Special  0.0  100.0  0.0  100.0 
   Andean  58.3  41.7  0.0  100.0 
   AEC 24  100.0  0.0       
TOTAL  16.9  83.1  13.0  87.0 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Ministry of Trade. 
 
Another interesting result is that all the investigations for dumping of agricultural products have 
ended with no duties being imposed, while in the case of industrial products, duties were denied in 
32% of the cases.  In the case of safeguards, it may be noted that all the investigations conducted 
for agricultural products have ended with the levying of measures, while 36% of the investigations 
for industrial products have resulted in no measures being imposed. 
 
A more detailed breakdown of the sectors that have requested the application of anti-dumping 
duties shows that chemicals, iron and steel products and petrochemicals represent almost 70% of 
the investigations (Chart III.3).
19  
                                                 
19  In most sectors, the investigations have concentrated on a few products. The cases of dumping in the 
chemical sector focus on orthophosphoric acid, ethyl acetate and fertilizers; in the petrochemical sector, 
polypropylene and suspension type polyvinyl chloride. The agricultural products are corn byproducts, 
poultry and rice. In textiles the investigated products are denim, polyester fiber and texturized yarns. In iron   25 
 
Chart III.3 
DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS BY SECTORS 
1990-2004 
 
Sectors  Number of Investigations  Percentage breakdown  Wo. Duties/ 
   Conducted  Wo. Duties  Conducted  Wo. Duties  Conducted 
Agricultural products  3  3  8.1  21.4  100.0 
Chemicals  10  2  27.0  14.3  20.0 
Petrochemicals  7  1  18.9  7.1  14.3 
Tires  2  2  5.4  14.3  100.0 
Textiles  3  3  8.1  21.4  100.0 
Tableware and crockery or china  2  0  5.4  0.0  0.0 
Iron & Steel  Products  9  2  24.3  14.3  22.2 
Stationary Batteries  1  1  2.7  7.1  100.0 
TOTAL  37  14  100.0  100.0  37.8 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Ministry of Trade.      
 
As for the safeguards, the sectoral breakdown is relatively different according to the type of 
instrument (Chart III.4). Most of the investigations under the WTO safeguard were made for 
textiles and apparel, and home appliances. Besides these two sectors, special safeguard 
investigations focus on chemicals and petrochemicals. In the case of the Andean safeguard, almost 
60% of the cases are agricultural and focus on two products: rice and vegetable oils. 
 
Summarizing, most of the dumping and safeguards investigations have involved industrial products. 
Additionally, the investigations on agricultural products have mainly concentrated on safeguards 
and in those few cases in which the application of anti-dumping duties were requested for this 
sector, they were denied. Finally, textiles, apparel, iron and steel products, and chemicals and 
petrochemicals are the sectors requesting more investigations, which is consistent with international 
patterns. In effect, data for dumping investigations in the western hemisphere shows that these 
tend to concentrate on chemicals, plastics, paper, textiles and basic metals.
20 
 
Chart III.4     SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATIONS BY SECTORS 
                                                                                                                                                     
and steel the products are steel bars, chrome plated sheets, iron or steel wire rods, billets, tin sheet and hot-
rolled steel. 
20 Tavares et al (2001) Antidumping in the Americas.   26 
1994-2004 
 Type of safeguard Wo. Measures/
Conducted Wo. Measures Conducted Wo. Measures Conducted
WTO SAFEGUARDS
Rice 1 0 9,1 0,0 0,0
Shoes 1 0 9,1 0,0 0,0
Textiles and apparel 6 0 54,5 0,0 0,0
Home appliances 2 0 18,2 0,0 0,0
Taxis 1 1 9,1 100,0 100,0
TOTAL 11 1 100,0 100,0 9,1
SPECIAL SAFEGUARD
Chemicals and petrochemicals 3 1 30,0 20,0 33,3
Textiles and apparel 3 2 30,0 40,0 66,7
Chains 1 0 10,0 0,0 0,0
Home appliances 3 2 30,0 40,0 66,7
TOTAL 10 5 100,0 100,0 50,0
ANDEAN COMMUNITY
Agricultural products 7 0 58,3 0,0 0,0
Extra-neutral alcohol 1 1 8,3 33,3 100,0
Polypropylene bags 2 1 16,7 33,3 50,0
Triplex and particle boards 1 0 8,3 0,0 0,0
Iron & Steel Products 1 1 8,3 33,3 100,0
TOTAL 12 3 100,0 100,0 25,0
AEC 24 ALADI
Agricultural products 1 0
TOTAL 34 9 26,5
Source: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Ministry of Trade.
Note: agricultural products appearing in the Andean safeguard are rice and refined vegetable oils.
Number of investigations Percentage breakdown  Type of safeguard Wo. Measures/
Conducted Wo. Measures Conducted Wo. Measures Conducted
WTO SAFEGUARDS
Rice 1 0 9,1 0,0 0,0
Shoes 1 0 9,1 0,0 0,0
Textiles and apparel 6 0 54,5 0,0 0,0
Home appliances 2 0 18,2 0,0 0,0
Taxis 1 1 9,1 100,0 100,0
TOTAL 11 1 100,0 100,0 9,1
SPECIAL SAFEGUARD
Chemicals and petrochemicals 3 1 30,0 20,0 33,3
Textiles and apparel 3 2 30,0 40,0 66,7
Chains 1 0 10,0 0,0 0,0
Home appliances 3 2 30,0 40,0 66,7
TOTAL 10 5 100,0 100,0 50,0
ANDEAN COMMUNITY
Agricultural products 7 0 58,3 0,0 0,0
Extra-neutral alcohol 1 1 8,3 33,3 100,0
Polypropylene bags 2 1 16,7 33,3 50,0
Triplex and particle boards 1 0 8,3 0,0 0,0
Iron & Steel Products 1 1 8,3 33,3 100,0
TOTAL 12 3 100,0 100,0 25,0
AEC 24 ALADI
Agricultural products 1 0
TOTAL 34 9 26,5
Source: Calculations by the authors based on data from the Ministry of Trade.
Note: agricultural products appearing in the Andean safeguard are rice and refined vegetable oils.
Number of investigations Percentage breakdown
 
 
F.  TWO CASE STUDIES 
 
An analysis of the previous sections suggests that it is interesting to look into two sectors more 
deeply. The first one is the agricultural sector, from which rice was selected for this paper because 
of the persistence in time of the measures to protect it against imports. This case is illustrative of 
the difficulty to manage the liberalization process when political considerations seem to prevail 
over technical ones. 
 
The second one is the textile-apparel sector, which reveals the problems that are created in a 
production chain when inputs become more expensive due to the application of duties or   27 
safeguard measures. In this case, the government’s decisions privileged the defense of the 
competitiveness of the productive chain. 
  
1.  Rice  
 
Rice stands out as one of the agricultural products with the highest number of investigation 
applications, both for dumping and safeguards. However, it should be noted that the commercial 
defenses imposed during the period under analysis were almost exclusively concentrated in the 
Andean market and suspended the benefits derived from the Andean free trade area. 
 
a)  Sector evolution 
Rice represents approximately 12% of Colombia’s cultivated area, it is the third most important 
crop in terms of extension, after coffee and corn, and represents 6% of the agricultural 
production.
21 This product is covered by the price band system, whereby the average ad 
valorem tariff between 1995 and 2003 was around 40%. 
 
According to 1999 data, the country has around 34,000 rice production units and a milling 
industry that employs approximately 5,000 people. The milling industry has an advanced level of 
technological development when compared to countries such as the United States, Brazil and 
Venezuela. In 2001, Colombia was ranked 23
rd in world rice production and third in the FTAA 
after the United States and Brazil. Yields per hectare are above the international average, with 4.9 
tons as compared to a world average of 3.9. 
 
The trade balance of rice had a deficit throughout almost all the 1990’s. During the decade, the 
imports of rice have mainly originated from three countries: Ecuador, the United States and 
Venezuela. Ecuador and Venezuela’s share of imports are 43% and 21%, respectively, while the 
United States and the Asian countries have shares of 21% and 13%. 
                                                 
21 See Ministry of Agriculture (2002),  Características y estructura de la cadena de arroz en Colombia. 
Observatorio de competitividad agrocadenas, Colombia.   28 
 
b)  Use of Trade Restrictions  
 
Rice stands out, together with refined oils, for concentrating most of the investigation applications 
involving agricultural products, both on grounds of dumping and safeguards. In the meetings held 
for this project with officials and former officials of the Ministry of Trade, there was a consensus 
on the strong political pressure that historically characterized the investigations of this product. It is 
important to note that, in the case of the applications for safeguards filed within the framework of 
the Andean Community, in two occasions the Government acted on its own initiative.  
 
The quantity of investigations and measures applied to the product during the period under 
analysis is surprising. One of the three investigations that were conducted since 1990 on grounds 
of dumping of agricultural products was done in 1994 concerning rice from Vietnam, and the 
application of duties was denied. Almost simultaneously there was a safeguard application 
motivated by the imports of the product from Vietnam, which ended with the levying of a tariff-
type measure that was to be reviewed at mid 1995. 
 
Later there were four investigations relating to safeguards for the product within the framework of 
the Andean Community, as a result of which imports were suspended for the period comprised 
between January 1996 and May 1998, through extensions of the measure  and the application of 
contingent measures during 2002 and 2003. It should be noted that the Andean safeguard does 
not establish a maximum period of application of a measure nor a limit to the extensions. Given the 
composition of the countries that supply rice to Colombia, the regulation of Andean imports 
affects a high percentage of the imports. 
 
As could be expected, this measure has generated an ongoing issue in the Andean Community, 
(especially with Ecuador), taking into account that Colombia is the main producer of rice in the 
Andean region, followed by Peru and Ecuador. As from 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture 
implemented the so-called Mechanism of Administration of Contingent Duties (MAC, for the   29 
Spanish language acronym) for some agricultural products –rice among them— and it is therefore 




2.  Textiles and Apparel 
 
The textiles-apparel sector is analytically interesting to the extent its representatives —together 
with those of the agricultural sector— have been noted for being most critical of the trade 
liberalization policy. This characteristic could help explain why, when analyzing trade defense 
instruments, this sector turns out to be among those that has applied for more measures and where 
the government has conducted several investigations on its own initiative. However, the 
government denied the imposition of duties and the adoption of safeguard measures when 
pertinent. 
 
a)  Sector Evolution  
 
The textiles sector represents close to 6% of the industrial production and the apparel sector 
approximately 3%, and they both constitute one of the sectors with the highest average tariffs in 
Colombia. While the average of the MFN average tariff is close to 11%, the average duty for this 
sector is 18%. The textiles sector shows a high concentration in a small number of firms, while the 
apparel sector is particularly atomized. 
 
The economic opening of the early 1990s had an important impact on these two sectors, 
especially on textiles, due to the growing penetration of imports in a context in which not all of the 
links in the production chain had a good competitive position. Colombia’s textiles and apparel 
industry had been characterized by a low penetration of imports in the period prior to the trade 
liberalization. By 1990, apparel’s penetration of imports was 3.2% while that of textiles was 
4.4%, with some exceptions in certain sub-sectors of manufactured textile products other than 
                                                 
22 The MAC works as an imports management instrument subject to the absorption of the national harvest.   30 
apparel. By the end of the 1990s, this indicator had increased to almost 30% in textiles and close 
to 10% in apparel. 
 
At the time of the opening, the cotton textile industry faced high labor costs and heavy 
indebtedness, as a result of an investment program leading to modernization and the reduction of 
labor costs. However, the companies in the sub-sector of woven products presented more 
advantageous competitive conditions in terms of low labor costs, low debt burden and vertical 
disintegration, and were able to respond more rapidly to the changes in the domestic and external 
demand. In the synthetic fibers sector, trade liberalization caused the closure of most of the 
existing companies, which were multinational and adopted strategies of regional relocation. Only 
one company (ENKA) survived the opening, in part due to the fact that it continued enjoying the 
tariff advantages derived from the Andean market. 
 
In the case of apparel, it is difficult to identify a distinctive behavior pattern, given the heterogeneity 
of the sector. However, it may be noted that during the 1990s apparel firms that competed in the 
high volume and low price market were particularly hit, while those dedicated to maquila 
processes or those that manufacture low to medium volumes at medium to high prices both for the 
domestic and international markets succeeded in surviving. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the whole production chain suffered the impact of a strong unfair 
competition generated by smuggling, due to the circumstantial exports of Asian products at very 
low prices, which affected all the countries in the region.  This situation led to considerable 
financial losses and in some cases resulted in the closing down or bankruptcy of firms, especially in 
the textiles sector. 
   31 
The difficult circumstances faced by the sector during the 1990s did not lead to the adoption of a 
particular commercial and industrial policy by the authorities. However, the sector was included 
within the competitiveness policy applied by the government between 1994 and 1998.
23 
 
In 1997 the government signed competitiveness agreements pursuant said policy with the textiles 
and apparel sector. In the commercial field, such agreements resulted in temporary tariff 
reductions for the import of capital goods and raw materials, a stronger enforcement of smuggling 
controls, and the modification of the legislation regarding safeguards and anti-dumping, to expedite 
investigations and introduce flexibility in the application criteria. However, as seen in the section on 
the evolution of the regulations of these instruments, the Government did not deviate from the 
multilateral arrangements in this regard. Only in the case of the so-called special safeguard it may 
have been responsive to private sector’s demands as reflected in the competitiveness agreement, 
but it should be noted that this instrument is not a safeguard in the strict sense of the word.  
Besides, almost all the applications made by the sector for the imposition of this instrument were 
denied. 
 
b)  The Use of Trade Restrictions  
 
Since 1990, there have been three dumping investigations and nine investigations to apply 
safeguard measures to products of the textiles-apparel sector in Colombia. This sector is not 
among those that has requested more anti-dumping measures, but –together with the agricultural 
sector – it is included in the group that has requested more safeguard measures. 
 
In no case did the applications for dumping result in the imposition of duties, while the adoption of 
measures was denied in only two of the nine safeguard investigations. The two denied safeguard 
measures were submitted through the special safeguard mechanism, while the six applications 
                                                 
23 The competitiveness policy was based on the joint work of the Government and the private sector to 
improve some cross-cutting issues that affect the performance of the economic sectors.  These factors include 
regulations, transport, infrastructure, human resources qualifications and raw materials import costs.   32 
filed for the WTO safeguard, including the transition facility of the Textiles and Apparel 
Agreement, ended with the imposition of measures. 
 
As mentioned above, there are two elements of interest for this analysis. On the one hand, the fact 
that two of the safeguard applications denied in 2001, for polyester fibers and texturized yarns, 
included an express recommendation to the Foreign Trade Ministry to begin a dumping 
investigation on its own initiative, which ended without duties being levied. On the other, this is the 
sector in which there was an objection to the safeguard measures applied within the WTO 
framework, in particular by Asian countries such as Thailand and Taiwan, but the objection did 
not go beyond a regular proceeding, at the end of which the measures had expired. 
 
The conclusions on the effect of the measures are not obvious.  Textiles and apparel imports grew 
at a declining rate until the middle of the 1990s, and at a lower average level during the second 
half of the decade. However, this is difficult to explain based exclusively on the use of commercial 
defense mechanisms since as from 1996 the economy suffered a sharp drop in growth. Finally, the 
amounts of both textile and apparel imports have not dropped to pre-liberalization levels (Graph 




A review of the investigations carried out evidences the government’s concern to act on behalf of 
the whole production chain. The case of synthetic yarns and fibers is illustrative in their condition 
as raw materials. Although for the decision-makers it was clear that the survival of the production 
lines of a firm with a long history in the country was at stake, no safeguard measures were applied, 
there was an unsuccessful dumping investigation and the government simply promoted an 




IV.  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE USE OF SAFEGUARDS AND ANTI-
DUMPING MEASURES IN COLOMBIA  
 
A review of the investigations conducted in the last few years by Colombia’s authorities to impose 
safeguard and anti-dumping measures reveals that there has not been a bias in favor of using one 
of the two instruments. Between 1990 and so far in 2004, 37 investigations into alleged cases of 












































textiles  apparel 
Source: DIAN   34 
dumping and 34 to assess the imposition of safeguards were initiated.
24 Duties were imposed in 
59% of the investigations for safeguards, while 51% of the cases of alleged dumping had a similar 
result. 
 
The pattern of use of safeguards and anti-dumping measures seems to respond to several factors. 
On the one hand, the design of the various instruments and the requirements for their imposition 
makes some easier to apply than others. On the other, although the institutional structure related 
with the decision-making process seems to have maintained a political space for the emergence of 
more or less protectionist inclinations of the government of the day, such discretionality seems not 
to have been used excessively. Finally, the profile of those who apply for the investigations (in 
terms of size, economic sector, etc.), also seems to play a role in the relative use of the 
instruments. 
 
A.  The Role of the Instruments  
 
As already mentioned, the evolution of Colombia’s anti-dumping legislation has followed two 
routes. On one hand, each new legal instrument in this regard has sought to better adapt to the 
multilateral regulations provided by the WTO. On the other, through time there is a clear tendency 
to making procedures more expeditious, always within the multilateral guidelines. 
 
The case of safeguards legislation has a different feature, to the extent that in the last few years 
the authorities have not only passed instruments in accordance with the evolution of the multilateral 
arrangements, which offer little margin for discretionality, but have moreover designed and 
implemented a more lax mechanism, so much so that, as mentioned, it is not a safeguard in the 
strict sense of the word but has an equivalent relief effect for the private sector within the margin of 
maneuver granted by the multilateral framework for tariff policy. A review of the circumstances 
                                                 
24 As already explained and analyzed in further detail below, the cases of safeguards include those of the so-
called “special safeguard”, which in a strict sense does not constitute a safeguard from the WTO’s 
perspective, but has played an important role in granting protection to various sectors.   35 
under which these instruments were designed and the way they have been employed leads us to 
assert that the use of the so-called special safeguard is more accessible to the private sector, and 
offers greater discretionality to the authorities than anti-dumping instruments. 
 
The first safeguard instrument, enacted by  Decree 809 of 1994, was the result of an initiative by 
the Government of the day designed to offer a lifesaver to sectors that at the time were under 
hardship due to the greater competition generated by the commercial opening. However, this 
initiative had more of a political than practical meaning, since the conditions imposed for 
application prevented its massive use.  The instrument was modified to adjust it to WTO rules by 
Decree 152 of 1998, which remains in force. 
 
While the use of the safeguard applicable to WTO member countries has been partially limited 
due to its strict requirements, there are three types of instruments offering greater flexibility. The 
first of these is a safeguard applicable to countries which are not members of the WTO, where the 
requirements for investigation are less strict and authorities have greater discretionality.
25 
 
The second is the procedure denominated special safeguard. Although this instrument does not 
allow for the increase of tariffs above the levels consolidated before the WTO, it has been very 
useful for authorities since it allows them to increase tariff levels above the Andean Common 
External Tariff, thus becoming an important relief measure for the private sector. 
 
The interviews conducted for this paper show that the enactment of the special safeguard sought 
to offer a more flexible mechanism to respond to protection requests by the private sector. A 
review of the requirements of the instrument seems to confirm it, since it introduces the concept of 
disruption, defined as an increase in imports or the existence of imports in unfair conditions such 
as low prices or important quantities, a concept less demanding that that of injury. 
 
                                                 
25 This safeguard was regulated by Decree 2657 of 1994 and later by Decree 1407 of 1999.   36 
The requirements to demonstrate a disruption are much more vague and lax than those 
corresponding to the demonstration of injury.  The relative use of the special safeguard seems to 
show that the private sector perceives it as a “user-friendly” instrument; since 1999 there have 
been 10 special safeguards investigations, a figure similar to the 11 investigations that were 
conducted since 1994 for WTO consistent safeguards. 
 
The third instrument that has made it possible to channel the demand of the private sector with 
greater flexibility than the WTO-consistent safeguard, is the safeguard applicable among Andean 
countries. This safeguard is an important relief mechanism for the private sector, to the extent that 
it makes it possible to suspend the benefits of the free trade area of the Andean region, which is 
the source of a significant portion of the imports of some products.
26  
 
The Andean safeguard has three conditions that facilitate its use. On the one hand, its application 
does not demand compensation to the countries affected by the measure. On the other, it makes 
use of the concept of disruption which, as already noted, is more lax than that of injury. Finally, 
the Andean regulations contemplate the levying of provisional duties while the Andean Community 
Secretariat makes a determination on each case. This circumstance guarantees a minimum of four 
months of protection, even in those cases in which the measure is considered to be unwarranted. 
The fact that 12 out of the 34 investigations that were initiated based on safeguard applications 
have corresponded to the Andean regulations, is an indication of the relative importance of the 
instrument to respond to the demands of the private sector. 
 
B.  The Role of Institutions  
 
It is possible to identify three instances in the investigation and decision-making processes 
regarding safeguard and anti-dumping measures applications. The first instance is responsible for 
carrying out the investigation processes, and it has always reported hierarchically to the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade. 
                                                 
26 See Annex 2 on the geographical source of Colombia’s imports.   37 
 
Once the investigations have been conducted, the Deputy Direction of Trade Practices formulates 
a recommendation and submits the case to the second instance, at the vice-ministerial level. In the 
case of investigations into alleged dumping, this second instance is the Unfair Practices Committee, 
while in the case of investigations linked to safeguards, it is the Customs and Tariff Affairs 
Committee. Both Committees are chaired by the Foreign Trade Vice-Minister and, with slight 
variations, have the vice-ministers of the economic areas as members. 
 
The instance making the final determination in the case of dumping investigations is the Minister of 
Foreign Trade. In general terms, there have been no cases of a Minister making a decision that 
opposes the recommendations of the Unfair Practices Committee, which underlines the 
importance of rigorous investigations and subsequent discussions among of the vice-ministers of 
the economic area. The instance making the final decision in applications linked to safeguard 
investigations is the Senior Foreign Trade Council, that has the Ministers of the economic areas as 
members and is chaired by the President of the Republic, which may deviate from the 
recommendations of the Customs and Tariff Affairs Committee. It is worthwhile noting that the 
Ministry of Agriculture usually undertakes the defense of the applications filed by this sector, 
which is not the case with the investigations requested by the industrial sector. With a few 
exceptions, this Council has operated with formal rigor and usually its decisions have had solid 
foundations. 
 
The interviews conducted for this paper revealed that the work of the officials responsible for the 
investigations complies with the regulatory requirements and is not usually interfered by political 
pressures from senior government levels, which does not mean that officials are fully protected 
from that sort of pressures. At the same time, the discussions of the vice-ministers usually balance 
technical and political criteria. Although such behavior is the general rule, there have been some 
minor exceptions that coincide with periods in which the government of the day had suffered a 
political setback, and sought to remedy it by granting preferential treatment to some 
representatives of the private sector. It may be noted that these temporary exceptions have not   38 
eroded the institutionality of the processes. In an interview with a Government official, an 
interesting hypothesis emerged in this sense. In his judgement, the fact that the majority of the 
applications for investigation has involved raw materials has made it very difficult to take measures 
for the benefit of a specific group, since the dynamics of liberalization has made evident the need 
to preserve the competitiveness of production chains in order to improve their insertion in 
international markets. 
 
The analysis of the institutional operation in the cases of dumping and safeguards indicates that, 
with the above-mentioned exceptions, the officials responsible for the investigation usually work in 
a serious and independent manner, and their recommendations are assessed by the vice-ministerial 
instance that brings together both technical and political criteria. The general opinion of those 
interviewed is that technical rigor has prevailed in that instance and the recommendations are 
generally adopted by the Minister or Senior Foreign Trade Council, as may be the case. 
According to this diagnosis, although authorities do have a margin for political considerations to 
prevail over technical criteria, this has not been the dominant behavior in Colombia. 
 
There is, however, one instance in which the inclination of the government or the minister of the 
day toward greater or lesser protection has become effective. It lies in the ability to modify the 
instruments and their procedures within the boundaries permitted by multilateral regulations. The 
issuance of the so-called special safeguard in 1999 is a case in point, to the extent that it opened 
up the possibility of a more discretional and expeditious protection in response to requests from 
the private sector. In other words, in some cases, by adjusting the rules, the authorities have 
sought to attain the flexibility and discretionality that are not afforded by the investigation and 
decision-making processes. 
 
Finally, it cannot be asserted that the relatively  little use of the anti-dumping and safeguard 
instruments in Colombia stems from a lack of resources. Although the Deputy Direction of Trade 
Practices has a staff of 10, including administrative officials, those interviewed estimate that the 
staffing is qualified and sufficient to process the applications that are filed. In the opinion of the   39 
current Deputy Director of Trade Practices, having more staff would make it possible to 
investigate cases more in depth and would reduce the workload per official, but would in no case 
determine the adoption of a greater number of measures or reduce the time. Additionally, although 
the budget is limited, resources have always been found to make on-site verifications and collect 
first-hand information. 
 
C.  The Role of the Applicants and the Affected Counterparts  
 
The sectors having requested more dumping investigations are, in order, chemicals, iron and steel 
and oil by-products. On the other hand, the sectors that have requested more investigations for 
the application of safeguards have been textiles, apparel, agricultural products (through the 
Andean safeguard), chemicals and petrochemicals. It may be noted that most of these sectors 
coincide with the majority of the dumping and safeguard investigations in the world. 
 
According to the interviews conducted for this document, the bulk of the private sector is ignorant 
on the use and meaning of the anti-dumping instruments and safeguards. The exception is usually 
found in large companies or in those that have traditionally been involved in foreign trade. In fact, 
the interviews show that, with a few exceptions, the companies that usually request an investigation 
for the imposition of antidumping measures and safeguards are those that have enough resources 
to pay a law firm. Similarly, investigation applications usually come from relatively concentrated 
sectors, in which it is easier for the interested parties to reach an agreement to demonstrate that an 
important proportion of a branch of domestic production has been affected. 
 
While hiring a law firm is not a requirement to file an application for investigation, most of the 
applicant firms usually prefer it. The competent authorities offer the firms induction mechanisms to 
apply for an investigation directly, an assistance that has been used in some instances. However, in 
most cases, the applying companies do not have sufficient staff to take care of the case directly, or 
they believe that law firms have an expertise that is worthwhile using. Additionally, it is clear that 
by hiring a law firm, interested parties not only acquire the technical expertise to file the application   40 
but also the potential of lobbying for the corresponding follow-up, sometimes at the most senior 
level. 
 
The preference for hiring law firms reinforces the trend for most applications to come from the 
largest companies. It is worthwhile noting that, although rates vary, the cost of hiring a law firm to 
apply for an investigation may amount to 50,000-75,000 dollars for the whole process. 
Importantly, the authorities or former officials consulted for this paper indicated that there is no 
bias in favor of applications filed by law firms. 
 
Several respondents pointed out that the applicants for investigations do not have a bias in favor of 
safeguards or antidumping mechanisms, and that they choose to request one or the other 
depending on the case they believe can be established. However, experts who have followed 
closely several cases pointed out that firms tend to perceive that it is more feasible to build a solid 
case by way of the safeguards, since the information required is of a domestic nature and more 
readily obtainable than that about international prices and/or costs required for a dumping case. 
This perception is probably reinforced by the greater flexibility of instruments such as the special 
safeguard or the Andean safeguard mentioned above. 
 
An analysis of the role played by the affected parties in an anti-dumping or safeguards 
investigation shows a mixed result. On the one hand, the technicians responsible for the 
investigations always comply with the requirement of consultation with the parties affected in the 
process. The respondents coincided in pointing out, however, that the role of the counterparts is 
limited because they have a shorter time to prepare their arguments than the one that was available 
to the applicants, since the later are already preparing their allegations prior to the submittal of the 
application. 
 
The relative lack of knowledge on the instruments and their operation also limits the potential 
reaction of the counterparts, since in many cases they become intimidated when they learn that the 
authorities are conducting an investigation, and prefer not to engage in the debate. In the case of   41 
dumping investigations, this situation usually results in the party that is the importer of the goods 
choosing to change the supplying country to avoid the problems they believe may be derived from 
the investigation. 
 
The stakeholder that is more absent in dumping and safeguard investigations is the consumer. 
Colombia does not have strong consumer associations to make their positions felt in the large 
national economic debates, let alone a specialized investigation. The only exception in this sense is 
the sporadic presence of the Superintendent of Trade and Industry at the vice-ministerial instance 
that analyzes the recommendations of the Deputy Direction of Trade Practices. This 
Superintendency is responsible for conducting the investigations related to anti-competitive 
practices and usually has consumer interests very much in mind. However, the Superintendency 
does not always attend the vice-ministerial meetings and when it does, it only has the right to 
speak but no vote. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
Colombia’s experience with the use of antidumping duties and safeguards shows that the 
government has not resorted to this option to satisfy the demands of the economic agents looking 
for greater protection, and that the number of applications that are filed is low when compared to 
international standards. 
 
This trend can be explained by the private sector’s relative ignorance regarding the instruments, 
and by the stability and soundness demonstrated by the institutional arrangements connected with 
the investigations and the decision-making process, even if they are not independent agencies 
within the government’s structure. 
 
The interviews and the cases analyzed in this document show that the dynamics of the trade 
liberalization process in the country created awareness on the importance of preserving the 
competitiveness of production chains to improve their insertion in the international markets. This   42 
fact has placed the government at a complex cross-roads at the time of restricting access of cheap 
raw materials, which helps explain the stability and prudence in the institutions associated with the 
process of commercial defense. However, the agricultural sector seems to lie beyond this logic 
and to the extent allowed by the instruments, the domestic market has often been closed, at least 
for Andean competition. The case of rice is illustrative in this regard. 
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ANNEX 1- Colombia: Total export destinations in 1989 and 2003 
1989  2003 
Country/ Zone  Share  US $ Millions  Country/ Zone  Share  US $ Millions 
Avg. annual 
Variation 
CAN (4)  5.4  309.3  CAN (2)  14.5  1,905.2  13.87 
Canada (9)  1.5  86.7  Canada   1.3  176.5  5.21 
Chile (7)  2.3  131.7  Chile (9)  1.4  188.2  2.58 
Other Alca   8.8  505.3  Other Alca   9.2  1,201.7  6.38 
Other E. Occ.  0.7  40.4  Other E. Occ.  1.1  141.5  9.36 
United States  40.8  2,343.2  United States  44.3  5,797.5  6.68 
Japan  4.4  250.2  Japan  1.5  201.5  -1.53 
MCCA (11)  0.9  52.2  MCCA (6)  2.8  363.9  14.87 
Mercosur (10)  1.0  59.1  Mercosur (12)  0.9  117.5  5.03 
Mexico (13)  0.4  25.1  Mexico (7)  2.7  358.2  20.89 
PECE (6)  2.9  165.6  PECE   0.5  68.5  -6.11 
Others   1.7  97.2  Others   5.4  704.9  15.20 
EU  29.2  1,676.5  EU  14.3  1,875.8  0.81 
TOTAL  100.0  5,742.7  TOTAL  100.0  13,100.8  6.07 
Source: Fedesarrollo figures with DANE data. 
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ANNEX 2- Colombia: Source of total imports in 1989 and 2003 
1989  2003 
Country/ Zone  Share  US $ Millions  Country/ Zone  Share  US $ Millions 
Avg. annual 
Variation 
CAN (6)  7.2  360.1  CAN (4)  11.1  1,446.8  10.4 
Canada (7)  4.0  202.0  Canada (8)  2.2  287.7  2.6 
Chile (9)  1.8  91.3  Chile (9)  2.1  275.6  8.2 
United States (1)  36.3  1,824.5  United States (1)  29.6  3,853.9  5.5 
Japan (4)  8.6  434.0  Japan (7)  4.6  604.5  2.4 
MERCOSUR (5)  8.4  421.6  MERCOSUR (5)  7.8  1,020.8  6.5 
Mexico (8)  2.5  123.4  Mexico (6)  5.4  708.2  13.3 
Others  9.7  488.2  Others (2)  21.5  2,801.4  13.3 
EU (2)  21.5  1,080.3  EU (3)  15.5  2,023.5  4.6 
TOTAL  100.0  5,025.4  TOTAL  100.0  13,022.4  7.0 
Source: Fedesarrollo figures with DANE data. 
 Notes: Between Brackets is the place the country or zone occupied in the ranking of the respective year. 
 